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SPINNING GOLD INTO STRAW: THE
ORDINARY USE OF THE EXTRAORDINARY
WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO REVIEW QUASILEGISLATIVE ACTIONS OF CALIFORNIA
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Joel S. Moskowitz*
INTRODUCTION

A formidable line of cases 1 supports the proposition that
mandamus is routinely available to review quasi-legislative actions2 of California administrative agencies. The mere sight of
0

1980 by Joel S. Moskowitz.
* Deputy Attorney General, State of California; B.A. 1967, J.D. 1970, University
of California (Los Angeles). The author is employed in the Environmental Section of
the Attorney General's Office, where he represents various state regulatory agencies.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those
of his office.
1. E.g., Clear Air Constituency v. California State Air Resources Bd., 11 Cal. 3d
801, 809, 523 P.2d 617, 621, 114 Cal. Rptr. 577, 581 (1974); Lewin v. St. Joseph Hospital of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 368, 383, 146 Cal. Rptr. 892, 901-02 (1978); Davies v.
Contractors' State License Bd., 79 Cal. App. 3d 940, 945, 145 Cal. Rptr. 284, 289-90
(1978); City of Santa Cruz v. Local Agency Formation Comm'n, 76 Cal. App. 3d 381,
390-91, 142 Cal. Rptr. 873, 878-79 (1978); Patterson v. Central Coast Regional
Comm'n, 58 Cal. App. 3d 833, 840, 130 Cal. Rptr. 169, 172-73 (1976); Board of Supervisors v. California Highway Comm'n, 57 Cal. App. 3d 952, 958, 129 Cal. Rptr. 504,
506-07 (1976); Swanson v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 56 Cal. App. 3d 512, 519, 128"Cal.
Rptr. 485, 489 (1976); Piontkowski v. Gedulgig, 39 Cal. App. 3d 498, 500, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 316, 318 (1974); Wilson v. Hidden Valley Mun. Water Dist., 256 Cal. App. 2d
271, 278 n.8, 63 Cal. Rptr. 889, 893 n.8 (1967); Brock v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. App.
2d 594, 601-03, 241 P.2d 283, 288-89 (1952).
2. As used herein, "quasi-legislative" action refers to "the formulation of a rule
to be applied in all future cases, while [a 'quasi-judicial'] . . . act involves the actual
application of such a rule to a specific set of existing facts." Strumsky v. San Diego
County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28, 35 n.2, 520 P.2d 29, 33 n.2, 112
Cal. Rptr. 805, 809 n.2 (1974).
The distinction between "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial" administrative
actions is sometimes difficult to draw, see id. at 42 n.14, 520 P.2d at 38 n.14, 112 Cal.
Rptr. at 814 n.14 (difficulty due in part to intrinsic imprecision betrayed by the preface "quasi"); Patterson v. Central Coast Regional Comm'n, 58 Cal. App. 3d 833, 840,
130 Cal. Rptr. 169, 172-74 (1976); Natural Resources Defense Council v. California
Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 57 Cal. App. 3d 76, 83, 129 Cal. Rptr. 57, 61-62
(1976); see also 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.01 (1958). The distinction may, in fact, not turn on the abstract nature of the decisions at all, but may
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such a host should ordinarily overwhelm, if not persuade, all
but the most stalwart of doubters. Nevertheless, the rule suffers from such a questionable genesis, is so patently at odds
with the governing statutes and settled principles of equity
practice, injects such procedural uncertainty and potential
mischief into review proceedings, and has gone critically unexamined for so long that there is some reason to believe that
the courts will follow up some broad hints3 and restore the
writ to its traditional and legislatively sanctioned role.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE RULE

A proper understanding of how the extraordinary writ of
mandamus was transformed into one of the routine methods
for reviewing quasi-legislative administrative actions leads directly to what should have been wholly irrelevant decisions
concerning review of quasi-judicialacts.
The first of these cases is Standard Oil v. State Board of
Equalization."Prior to that case it was "the law of this state,
settled for many years, that certiorari might issue to review
the quasi-judicial determinations of state-wide administrative
bodies." 5 In Standard Oil, however, the
statutory provision for review of the acts of a nonjudicial
administrative board by writ of certiorari was held invalid
on the ground that the writ lies only to review the acts of
judicial tribunals, and that the statute making it applicable to nonjudicial bodies was an attempt to enlarge the
constitutional jurisdiction of the court.
A year later, in Whitten v. California State Board of Optomerather represent a conclusion that the species of decision in question affects "too

many" people to practically afford the due process guarantees attached to adjudicatory decisions. Horn v. County of Ventura, 24 Cal. 3d 605, 612-14, 596 P.2d 1134,
1137-38, 156 Cal. Rptr. 718, 721-23 (1979). Despite its uncertain denotation, the term
is unavoidable, as it is used almost exclusively in the reported cases (e.g., Patterson v.
Central Coast Regional Comm'n, 58 Cal. App. 3d at 839 n.4, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 172)
and may for present purposes be adequately conceived as the adoption of a "rule" or
"regulation" by a "process that resembles a legislature's enactment of a statute." 1 K.
DAVIS, supra at 285.
3. See text accompanying notes 100-22 infra.
4. 6 Cal. 2d 557, 59 P.2d 119 (1936).
5. Turrentine, Restore Certiorari to Review Statewide Administrative Bodies
in California, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 275, 275 (1941).
6. Modern Barber College v. California Employment Stabilization Comm'n, 31
Cal. 2d 720, 730-31, 192 P.2d 916, 922 (1948).
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try the California Supreme Court likewise held unanimously
that "prohibition would not lie to review statewide agencies
empowered to exercise judicial functions."
'rhis sudden elimination of the only methods of review of
statewide administrative agency decisions was the occasion for
considerable discomfort. As one commentator described the
situation:
The legal profession was aghast at these decisions.
Had state administrative agencies been put beyond the
reach of the courts? No matter what errors of law or procedure they might commit or how arbitrary might be
their finding of facts, or what excesses of jurisdiction they
might commit, the only writs known to our law could no
longer be used.9
Had these decisions any impact on court review of quasilegislative administrative decisions? None at all. It had long
before been held that certiorari did not lie to review decisions
not arguably "judicial."1 0 Likewise, prohibition never did lie
to review an action "[i]n no sense. . . judicial in its nature.""
If the problem raised by these cases did not focus on
quasi-legislative administrative actions, the supreme court's
solution would later be applied to such actions even in the
absence of a problem. In Drummey v. State Board of Funeral
Directors," the court seized the idea that "mandamus is the
proper remedy to secure . . . where no other remedy exists."'
While the court might have expected at least some faint
expression of gratitude for this discovery, none is detectible.
Condemnations centered around two issues. First, the court's
solution, as it later admitted, is impossible to reconcile with
any previous understanding concerning the functions of mandamus, even ignoring the statutes:
7. 8 Cal. 2d 444, 65 P.2d 1296 (1937).
8. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 138, 481 P.2d 242, 247, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 239
(1971).
9. McGovney, The California Chaos in Court Review of the Decisions of State
Administrative Agencies, 15 S. CAL. L. REV. 391, 400 (1942); see also McGovney,
Court Review of Administrative Decisions in California:The Pending State Constitutional Amendment, 30 CALIF. L. REV. 507 (1942).
10. E.g., Brown v. Board of Supervisors 124 Cal. 274, 277-78, 57 P. 82,
83
(1899); People v. Oakland Bd. of Educ., 54 Cal. 375, 376 (1880).
11. People v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 54 Cal. 404, 406 (1880).
12. 13 Cal. 2d 75, 87 P.2d 848 (1939).
13. Id. at 82-83, 87 P.2d at 852-53.
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Historically, the writ has been used for far narrower
Mandamus has traditionally been merely
purposes ....
a proceeding to compel the performance of ministerial duIn jurisdictions where other means exist for reties ....
viewing the acts and decisions of administrative bodies
.. . there has been no necessity for enlarging the writ of
mandamus beyond its conventional sphere . . .. Our
later decisions have recognized that the use of mandamus
to review acts of administrative agencies is a departure
from the traditional purpose of the writ .... "

As one author less charitably put it, "[M]andamus has been
expanded into a veritable lis mirabilis unknown before on
land or sea."1 5 The second problem centered about the court's
somewhat vague but expansive pronouncements concerning
the scope of judicial review under this newly devised

remedy.16

17
The furor over these issues largely subsided when "the
Legislature by enacting Civil Procedure Code section 1094.5 in
effect ratified such judicially developed remedy so far as it
could constitutionally do so.18
In contrast to the controversy surrounding judicial review
of quasi-judicial administrative actions, we hear nothing comparable from the courts or the commentators concerning review of quasi-legislative actions from the founding of the
State until the fifth decade of this century. There are several

14. Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Employment Comm'n, 17 Cal. 2d 321, 32829, 109 P.2d 935, 940-41 (1941).
15. Turrentine, supra note 5, at 276. So far as the author has been able to discover, the phrase lis mirabilis is itself "unknown before on land or sea." As the words
have no appropriate meaning in this context, they are perhaps best understood as an
expression, and possibly a product, of Professor Turrentine's consternation.
See also McGovney, supra note 9, 15 S. CAL. L. REV. at 400; McGovney, Administrative Decisions and Court Review Thereof, in California, 29 CALF. L. REV. 146,
149 (1941).
16. See discussion and citations in Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 140 n.5, 481
P.2d 242, 248 n.5, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 240 n.5 (1971).
17. Id. See Kleps, CertiorarifiedMandamus: Court Review of California Administrative Decisions 1939-49, 2 STAN. L. REV. 285 (1950); Kleps, Certiorarified
Mandamus Reviewed: The Courts and California Administrative Decisions-19491959, 12 STAN. L. REV. 554, 583 (1960). But see Witkin, The Extraordinary
Writ-Friend or Enemy, 29 J. ST. B. CAL. 467, 474 (1954).
18. Grant v. Board of Medical Examiners, 232 Cal. App. 2d 820, 826, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 270, 274 (1965). The court did not develop the seeming implication that the
judicially developed remedy was in part irreconcilable with the Constitution. See also
note 99 infra; Temescal Water Co. v. Department Pub. Works, 44 Cal. 2d 90, 105, 280
P.2d 1, 10 (1955).
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reasons for this silence.

In the first place, the farther one goes back in time, the
fewer regulations existed to provide fodder for judicial review. 19 This, however, was scarcely less true of quasi-judicial
decisions. ° Part of the reason for the early silence concerning
quasi-legislative actions doubtless inheres in the fact that it
was no simple matter, until at least 1943, to determine the
content of such rules and regulations which had been adopted.
[T]he California legislature did not generally require
that the rules or regulations of state administrative agencies be formalized or registered anywhere until the adoption of the amendments to the Government Code to this
end [in 1941]. In order to implement such notoriety as
could be accomplished by filing existing rules with the
Secretary of State, the statute further provided that any
rule not so filed would be deemed repealed. Even this
modest beginning was rendered ineffectual until 1943 by
the absence of appropriation for the codification and indexing of such rules created by the 1941 legislation. At
that time there was no provision for publication of such
rules as so filed and most administrative agencies did not
make the rules adopted by them generally available to the
public and to the persons directly affected in any usable
21
form.

Such ignorance must have posed a significant barrier to the
contents of regulations being called to the attention of the
courts.
Most fundamental, however, is that the courts were never
required to cast about in search of a remedy for allegedly arbitrary or invalid quasi-legislative actions. First, an injunction
could be sought, in a proper case, against the enforcement of
the allegedly invalid regulation.2
19.
20.
21.

15

Gaylord v. City of Pasadena, 175 Cal. 433, 436, 166 P. 348, 350
(1917).
Id.
Hutchinson, Rule Making Function of California Administrative
Agencies,

HASTINGS

L.J. 272, 274 (1964).

22. E.g., Carter v. Stevens, 211 Cal. 281, 295 P. 28 (1930)
(attempt to enjoin
"the threatened enforcement of the rules promulgated by the state
fire marshal . . .
on the ground that as applied to [appellants] the requirements
of said rules were
oppressive and burdensome and entailed unreasonable and unnecessary
expense to
them." Id. at 283, 295 P. at 32-33); see Brock v. Superior Court,
11 Cal. 2d 682, 81
P.2d 931 (1938). Attempts to enjoin the enforcement of local
ordinances were fairly
common, see, e.g., Parker v. Colburn, 196 Cal. 169, 170, 236 P.
921, 922 (1925); Gaylord v. City of Pasadena, 175 Cal. 433, 435, 166 P. 348, 349 (1917);
Wilson v. City of

356
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The development of an additional remedy was launched
in 1921-a year before Standard Oil-with the enactment of
23
the Declaratory Relief Act. While at first it was held that
this remedy was unavailable against the State and its subdivisions, 24 the state supreme court ruled otherwise in 1942.25 Although the curious rule became established that declaratory
relief could not be had to review quasi-judicial administrative
decisions, 20 no doubt was ever expressed concerning the availability of declaratory relief to review the validity of regula27
tions and ordinances.
Cream & Butter Ass'n
Alhambra, 158 Cal. 430, 111 P. 254 (1910). See also Challenge
order of the
v. Parker, 23 Cal. 2d 137, 142 P.2d 737 (1943) (suit to enjoin principle
668 (1910).
665,
P.2d
101
279,
275,
2d
Cal.
15
Parker,
v.
Director of Agriculture); Ray
CIv. PROC. CODE
23. 1921 Cal. Stats. ch. 463, § 1, at 689 (current version at CAL.
§ 1060 (West Supp. 1979)) which reads in part:
who
Any person interested under a . . .written instrument, .... or
in
or
another,
to
respect
with
duties
or
desires a declaration of his rights
controactual
of
cases
in
may,
.
.
.
property
upon
or
over
in,
to,
respect
parties,
versy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective
and
rights
his
of
declaration
a
for
court
superior
the
in
action
bring an
conof
question
any
of
duties in the premises, including a determination
struction or validity arising under such instrument or contract.
(1942); Irvine
24. Courney v. Byram, 54 Cal. App. 2d 769, 772, 129 P.2d 721, 723
122 P.2d 320,
709,
707,
2d
App.
Cal.
49
Dist.,
Drainage
v. Sacramento & San Joaquin
340, 119 P.2d
321 (1942); Bayshore Sanitary Dist. v. San Mateo, 48 Cal. App. 2d 337,
(1941).
753
752,
804 (1942).
25. Hoyt v. Board of Civil Serv. Comm'rs, 21 Cal. 2d 399, 132 P.2d
1281, 1290,
P.2d
524
249,
237,
3d
Cal.
12
Court,
Superior
v.
26. See, e.g., State
Co. v. City of
115 Cal. Rptr. 497, 506 (1974) (calling the rule "settled"); Selby Realty
Cal. Rptr. 799, 810
San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 127, 574 P.2d 111, 122, 109
1137, 1139, 99 Cal.
(1973); Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541, 546, 492 P.2d
App. 3d 992, 1004,
Cal.
54
Angeles,
Los
of
County
v.
Ltd.
Rptr. 745, 747 (1972); Faix
Inc., 252 Cal. App.
127 Cal. Rptr. 182, 190 (1976); Escrow Owners Ass'n v. Taft Allen,
Examiners, 232
Medical
of
Board
v.
Grant
(1967);
757
755,
2d 506, 510, 60 Cal. Rptr.
Cal. App. 2d 820, 826, 43 Cal. Rptr. 270, 274 (1965).
2d 499, 500,
The trail of citations leads back to Hostetter v. Anderson, 38 Cal.

241 P.2d 230, 231 (1952), which in turn relies solely on the JUDICIAL

COUNCIL OF CALI-

137 (1944).
[declaratory]
The report itself, however, says only: "There is no indication that such
Id. As such an
relief would be available where quasi judicial action is involved..."
of these cases
indication would be expected to come from the courts, the analysis
becomes circular.
140 P.2d
27. California Drive-In Restaurant Ass'n v. Clark, 22 Cal. 2d 287, 289,
214,
Rptr.
Cal.
107
56,
49,
3d
App.
Cal.
31
657, 659 (1943); Taschner v. City Council,
(1955); C.
558-59
556,
P.2d
281
52-53,
49,
2d
App.
Cal.
132
Park,
v.
Bess
222 (1973);
P.2d 969, 971-72
Dudley De Velbiss Co. v. Kraintz, 101 Cal. App. 2d 612, 615-16, 225
929, 944 (1947);
P.2d
180
819-20,
813,
2d
App.
Cal.
79
Robertson,
v.
Jones
(1951);
120 P.2d
750-51,
746,
2d
App.
Cal.
48
Power,
Monahan v. Department of Water &
Cal. App. 2d 515,
6
Comm'rs,
Planning
City
of
Board
v.
Greenfield
(1941);
732-33
730,
is a "writ518, 45 P.2d 219, 220 (1935) (taking the interesting view that an ordinance
AND THE LEGISLATURE
FORNIA, TENTH BIENNIAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR
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The Administrative Procedure Act, enacted in 1947,28
specifically authorized declaratory relief as a means of reviewing the validity of regulations2 9 adopted pursuant to that Act.
The new Government Code section 11440 provided in part:
Any interested person may obtain a judicial declaration
as to the validity of any regulation by bringing an action
for declaratory relief in the superior court in accordance
with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure .... s0
Finally, the validity of regulations could be challenged in actions brought
to review
quasi-judicial
enforcement
proceedings."'
In sum, at no time could it be said of the quasi-legislative
acts of state administrative agencies, as it was of their quasijudicial acts, that "[t]he only possible remedy of the person
adversely affected is by writ of mandate. ' 3 2 If the clarion call
to judicial innovation is inaudible to our ears, it was clearly
perceived in 1952 by a court which was, unfortunately, unable
to reproduce the notes.
ten instrument" within the terms of the statute); Andres v. City of Piedmont,
100
Cal. App. 700, 700-01, 281 P. 78, 78 (1929) (relying on the more obvious
"declaration
of ... rights or duties" language). But see Honeywell, Inc. v. State Bd.
of Equalization, 48 Cal. App. 3d 907, 912-13, 122 Cal. Rptr. 243, 246-47 (1975) and
cases cited
therein, which can be read to suggest that prior to the enactment of CAL.
Gov'T CODE
§ 11440 (West 1966) the regulations of state governmental agencies were
beyond the
scope of declaratory relief. The reasoning, however, would also place local
regulations,
to this day, beyond the reach of declaratory relief, a proposition refuted by
the above
cases.
28. 1947 Cal. Stats., ch. 1425, § 1, at 2984 (current version at CAL. GOV'T CODE
§
11370 (West 1966 & Supp. 1979)).
29. The term "regulation" was defined as meaning:
JE]very rule, regulation, order or standard of general application or the
amendment, supplement or revision of any such rule, regulation, order
or standard adopted by any state agency to implement, interpret, or
make specific the law enforced or administered by it, or to govern its
procedure, except one which relates only to the organization or internal
management of the state agency.
Id. at 2985 (current version at CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11371(b) (West 1966)) (Article 1
of
the Administrative Procedure Act).
30. Id. at 2990 (current version at CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11440 (West 1966))
(Article 5 of Administrative Procedure Act).
31. See Hutchinson, supra note 21 at 275; Chas. L. Harney, Inc. v. Contractors'
State License Bd., 39 Cal. 2d 561, 564-65, 247 P.2d 913, 915 (1952).
32. Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors & Embalmers, 13 Cal. 2d
75, 84,
87 P.2d 848, 853 (1939).

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
THE RULE ESTABLISHED:

[Vol. 20

Brock v. Superior Court

The historic occasion evoking the rule that mandamus is
ordinarily available to review quasi-legislative administrative
actions was a challenge to a regulation governing lima beans.
In Brock v. Superior Court,38 dealers and growers filed a petition for a writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 to challenge a "marketing order" that was
designed to coordinate and regulate the production and merchandising of the beans.8 4 It was contended, based solely on
5
materials outside the record, that the findings of the Director of Agriculture were not supported "by the weight of, or
substantial, evidence."

6

The trial court did not examine the evidence in the record and, additionally, refused to consider new evidence of87
fered by the dealers and growers. Instead, it issued a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the Director to exercise
his statutory power to call a hearing and reconsider the marketing order in light of the new evidence." Pending the outcome of this hearing, and a report thereon by the Director, a
the enforcepreviously issued preliminary injunction against
39
ment of the order was continued in effect. The Director appealed and requested writs of prohibition and supersedeas
against the trial court,40 these petitions generated the instant
appellate decision.
The court of appeal granted the relief requested by the
Director.4 1 The only thing the trial court was adjudged to
have done wrong, however, was to entertain an action demanding reconsideration of the order in light of new evidence
without the exhaustion of the administrative remedy4 2of asking the Director to call a hearing to amend the order. While
33. 109 Cal. App. 2d 594, 241 P.2d 283 (1952).
34. Id. at 596-98, 241 P.2d at 285-86.
35. Id. at 608, 241 P.2d at 292.
36. Id. at 597, 241 P.2d at 286.
37. Id. at 607, 241 P.2d at 291-92.
38. Id. at 597, 241 P.2d at 286.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 610, 241 P.2d at 294.
failure
42. It is a familiar rule that where an administrative remedy is available,
v.
States
United
relief.
any
grant
to
to exhaust it deprives the courts of jurisdiction
v. District Court
Abelleira
(1941);
29
26,
P.2d
120
194,
189,
2d
Cal.
19
Court,
Superior
Metcalf v.
of Appeal, 17 Cal. 2d 280, 291-92, 109 P.2d 942, 949 (1941); see also
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the court of appeal concluded that certain of the trial court's
rulings, rulings in the Director's favor, were rightly decided,"3
these issues were obviously neither within the scope of the Director's petition,"' nor were they the basis of the ruling disapproving the trial court's action. It was in the course of examining those rulings that the court concluded, in dicta,"' that the
proper method of review was by way of mandamus
proceedings."6
In so concluding, the court first established the indisputable premises that the Director's action was quasi-legislative,
and that the legislative history makes it "crystal clear" that
section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure was intended to
apply only to quasi-judicial acts."7
Having ascended to this sturdy platform, the court
stepped resolutely into thin air. Feeling impelled to answer
"the question, to what extent, independently of section 1094.5
of the Code of Civil Procedure, can the writ of mandate be
County of Los Angeles, 24 Cal. 2d 267, 269, 148 P.2d 645, 646-47 (1944); Alexander v.
State Personnel Bd., 22 Cal. 2d 198, 199-200, 137 P.2d 433, 434 (1943).
If the Director's hostility to the trial court's order was in part caused by his
disagreement with the proposition that a hearing ought to be held, there was little
point to ruling that he should have been asked to do so; exhaustion is excused when
futile. See 17 Cal. 2d at 301-02, 109 P.2d at 953-54. It may be assumed, therefore,
that his objection was to the order restraining the enforcement of the marketing order pending the modification hearing and return thereon.
43. The trial court was held to have rightly refused to examine evidence outside
the record. 109 Cal. App. 2d at 608, 241 P.2d at 292. Likewise, it was held that no
error was committed when the trial court failed to examine the evidence in the record
to determine its sufficiency, as the respondents were "proceeding wholly upon the
theory that they were entitled to upset the director's action by events occurring subsequently to the proceeding before him." Id.
44. Assuming real parties were "aggrieved" by these rulings, their remedy was
by way of appeal or cross-appeal. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 902 (West Supp. 1979)
(formerly CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 938 (West 1955)); CAL. R. CT. 3.
45. As the trial court's action was disapproved, any "statement in the opinion
that a contrary finding could not have been sustained is necessarily dicta." Windsor
v. Windsor, 42 Cal. App. 2d 464, 466, 109 P.2d 363, 364 (1941); see People v. Goree,
240 Cal. App. 2d 304, 310, 49 Cal. Rptr. 392, 395 (1966).
46. The holding on exhaustion would not have been at all impacted by a different finding concerning the nature of the proceedings below, as exhaustion of administrative remedies is required not only in "traditional" mandamus actions, as the court
held, but also in "administrative" mandamus actions pursuant to the Code of Civil
Procedure section 1094.5. See Miller v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control,
160 Cal. App. 2d 658, 325 P.2d 601 (1958), W. DEERING, CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATIVE
MANDAMUS § 6.18, at 103 (1967). See also id., § 6.19, at 103-04 (actions for
declaratory
relief or injunction); Bleeck v. State Bd. of Optometry, 18 Cal. App. 3d 415, 432, 95
Cal. Rptr. 860, 871 (1971).
47. 109 Cal. App. 2d at 597-601, 241 P.2d at 285-89.
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used to review the quasi-legislative action of an administrative
body,

'14

the court first quoted various authorities for the pro-

will issue in the absence of other availposition that mandate
49
able remedies.
Seemingly poised to apply that proposition to the case at
bar, the court posited:
[T]here certainly must be some way of reviewing the
quasi-legislative acts of an administrative officer, at least
to the extent of determining whether in issuing the order
in question the proceedings were as prescribed by law,
there was any evidence upon which to base his action,
etc., and if there is no other adequate remedy, then the
historic remedy of mandate must apply. 0
The other shoe never did drop, however. The court could
not escape recognizing that there were available remedies in
declaratory and injunctive relief.51 It therefore abandoned, indeed contradicted, this line of reasoning entirely and abruptly
sailed off on an entirely new tack:
While originally mandate would not lie if there were
other remedies available, that is no longer the situation in
California .... Therefore, the fact that an action in declaratory relief lies ... and there is some indication that
in a proper case injunction will lie . . . does not prevent

the use of mandate.52

48. Id. at 601, 241 P.2d at 289.
49. Historically, the writ of mandate was invented to provide a remedy
where no other remedy existed. As is stated in 9 Halsbury's Laws of
England, 744, section 1269, in speaking of the writ of mandamus:
"'Its purpose is to supply defects of justice; and accordingly it will
issue, to the end that justice will be done, in all cases where there is a
specific legal right and no specific legal remedy for enforcing such right.'
(See also, 16 Cal. Jur. 764, sec. 4)" (Drummey v. State Board of Funeral
Directors, 13 Cal. 2d 75, 82 [87 P.2d 848]).
In the Drummey [case] and other cases following it [footnote omitted] our
Supreme Court laid down some rules concerning mandate which, although there referring only to the review of license cases, probably
would apply to any administrative board action reviewable by the
courts. In the Drummey case, supra (13 Cal. 2d 75, 82), the court said:
"... in the absence of a proper statutory method of review, mandate is
the only possible remedy available to those aggrieved by administrative
rulings of the nature here involved."
109 Cal. App. 2d at 601-02, 241 P.2d at 288-89.
50. Id. at 602, 241 P.2d at 289.
51. See text accompanying notes 27-30 supra.
52. 109 Cal. App. 2d at 603, 241 P.2d at 289 (citations omitted).
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With that, the court ended the defense of its .conclusion.
THE "OTHER ADEQUATE REMEDIES" DOCTRINE:

A

PREMATURE

OBITUARY

Having in mind the rationale underlying the rule, we turn
to its well-deserved critical examination. Mark Twain once
complained to the Associated Press that its report of his
death was an exaggeration. 5

The report in Brock

that the
"other remedies" rule is dead in California cannot
be so charitably dismissed, as the court, perhaps unlike the Associated
Press, should easily have known better.
Brock cites only the 1943 decision in Sipper v. Urban54
for the proposition that the "other remedies" doctrine is dead
in California. While we might therefore excuse the court for
ignoring all of the pre-1943 authority for the rule, some of
which it quoted, 5 its ignorance of all the authority for the
doctrine after the decision in Sipper and before the writing of
its opinion, including six decisions of the supreme court56 (five
of them no more than four years old) is hard to excuse.
53. Cablegram from London to the Associated Press, June 2, 1897.
54. 22 Cal. 2d 138, 137 P.2d 425 (1943).
55. Note 49, supra. See Andrews v. Police Court, 21 Cal. 2d 479,
480, 133 P.2d
398, 398-99 (1943); Irvine v. Gibson, 19 Cal. 2d 14, 15-16, 118
P.2d 812, 813 (1941);
Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Employment Comm'n, 17 Cal. 2d
321, 329, 109 P.2d
935, 949 (1941); Crandall v. Amador County, 20 Cal. 72, 75 (1862),
where the court
stated:
The invariable test . . . by which the right of a party applying
for a
[writ of] mandamus is determined, is ... whether there is any adequate
remedy to which he can resort to enforce his right. If there is, he
cannot
have a [writ of] mandamus ....
To prevent a failure of justice, and
only for this, the Court will avail itself of this extraordinary power.
See also Goodwin v. Glazer, 10 Cal. 333, 334 (1858); Draper v. Noteware,
7 Cal. 276,
278 (1857); Coombs v. Smith, 17 Cal. App. 2d 454, 455, 62 P.2d
380, 381 (1936);
Potomic Oil Co. v. Dye, 10 Cal. App. 534, 537, 102 P. 677, 678
(1909).
56. Phelan v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 363, 366, 217 P.2d
951, 953 (1950),
where the court stated:
Although the statute [CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1086 (West 1955)]
does not expressly forbid the issuance of the writ [of mandate]
if another adequate remedy exists, it has long been established as a general
rule that the writ will not be issued if another such remedy is available
to the petitioner. [Citations omitted.] The burden, of course, is
on the
petitioner to show that he did not have such a remedy.
See Security-First Nat'l Bank v. Board of Supervisors, 35 Cal. 2d
323, 327, 217 P.2d
948, 951 (1950); Phyle v. Duffy, 34 Cal. 2d 144, 152, 208 P.2d 668,
672 (1949); Vista
Irrigation Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, 32 Cal. 2d 477, 478, 196
P.2d 926, 926 (1948);
Sherman v. Quinn, 31 Cal. 2d 661, 664, 192 P.2d 17, 19 (1948); Kahn
v. Smith, 23 Cal.
2d 12, 16, 142 P.2d 13, 14 (1943).
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What is inexcusable is that Sipper cannot, except by the
wildest misreading, stand for the proposition for which it was
cited. In that case, a writ of mandate was filed to review the
quasi-judicial order of the Real Estate Commissioner suspending a broker's license. In a single paragraph, the court
rejected the lone contention that the trial court could not refuse the writ without according the broker a hearing on his
petition. The court ruled that, where no abuse of discretion is
shown on the face of the petition, it is not error to deny the
7
writ without a hearing. The opinion spans less than four
pages; it brooks no misreading. It breathes not a hint of the
momentous holding for which it is cited in Brock.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Traynor notes that the
Real Estate Act provided for review of this quasi-judicial decision by way of certiorari, and states in passing that "[s]o long
as this procedure is not held unconstitutional the present proceeding in mandamus should be dismissed under the Real Estate Act."'58 Of course, ever since Standard Oil, review by certiorari of a quasi-judicial decision was unconstitutional. As
Justice Schauer noted in his concurring opinion, mandamus
availahas been "repeatedly affirmed as the only tenable and59
'
ble proceeding for review of state board proceedings."
Clearly, then, had the court been of a mind to reach the
constitutional issue, it would have declared the statute calling
for certiorari unconstitutional. There was, however, no reason
to reach that issue. The pleading was patently defective;
whatever the remedy invoked, no cause of action was stated.
The court ignored the suggestion of Justice Traynor in obvious deference to "the long-established rule that an appellate
court will not enter upon the resolution of constitutional questions unless absolutely necessary to a disposition of the
appeal." 60
57. 22 Cal. 2d at 141, 137 P.2d at 426-27.
58. Id. (Traynor, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 144-45, 137 P.2d at 427-28.
60. Bayside Timber Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 20 Cal. App. 3d 1, 5-6, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 431, 433 (1971). See also Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc., 32 Cal. 2d 53, 66,
P. 187,
195 P.2d 1, 9 (1948); Matin Mun. Water Dist. v. Dolge, 172 Cal. 724, 726, 158
v.
People
(1903);
425
424,
P.
73
534,
532,
Cal.
139
Johnson,
of
Estate
188 (1916);
Kozden, 36 Cal. App. 3d 918, 923, 111 Cal. Rptr. 826, 828 (1974); In re Henry G., 28
Cal. App. 3d 276, 278-79, 104 Cal. Rptr. 585, 586-87 (1972), where the court stated:
It is elementary that a court will not decide a constitutional question
unless absolutely necessary and . . .even though a constitutional ques-
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But even this refutation concedes to Brock far more than
it deserves. Justice Traynor was obviously not urging the
abandonment of the "other remedies" doctrine; he was urging
consideration of the applicability of Standard Oil to the statute calling for review by certiorari. Exactly what the court in
Brock was thinking of when it cited Sipper must remain an
impenetrable mystery of jurisprudence.
The firmest refutation of Brock, however, is not analytical, but historical. Numerous cases after Brock, paying not the
slightest attention to Brock's funeral oration, continue to cite
the "other remedies" doctrine as the settled law in
California."
Justice Holmes described the situation as "revolting"
where a rule of law persists although "the grounds upon which
it was laid down have vanished long since and the rule simply
persists from blind imitation of the past.

62

The persistence of

the rule in Brock is worse, for the sole ground upon which it
was laid down never existed in the first place, but was bogus
ab initio.
At present, then, the rule in Brock, that mandate is available to review quasi-legislative actions irrespective of the adequacy of other remedies, exists side by side with the doctrine
applied in all other cases that mandate is not available in the
tion may be legitimately presented by the record, if the record also
presents some other and satisfactory ground upon which a court may
rest its judgment and thereby render the constitutional question immaterial to the case, that course will be adopted, and the question of constitutionality will be left for consideration until the case arises which
cannot be adjudicated without considering it . . . . (Citation omitted).
61. E.g., People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 5 Cal. 3d 480, 491, 487
P.2d 1193, 1199, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553, 559 (1971); Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. Quinn, 54 Cal.
2d 507, 511, 354 P.2d 1, 3, 6 Cal. Rptr. 545, 547 (1960); City of Long Beach v. Board
of Supervisors, 50 Cal. 2d 674, 680, 328 P.2d 964, 967 (1958); Tevis v. City & County
of San Francisco, 43 Cal. 2d 190, 198, 272 P.2d 757, 762 (1954) ("It is a general rule
that the extraordinary remedy of mandate is not available when other remedies at
law are adequate."); Cartwright v. Swoap, 40 Cal. App. 3d 567, 571, 115 Cal. Rptr.
402, 404 (1974); Tivens v. Assessment Appeals Bd., 31 Cal. App. 3d 945, 947, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 679, 680 (1973); Hollister Canning Co. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 186,
192-93, 102 Cal. Rptr. 713, 717 (1972); Betancourt v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd.,
16 Cal. App. 3d 408, 412, 94 Cal. Rptr. 9, 12 (1971); Pettis v. Municipal Court, 12 Cal.
App. 3d 1029, 1031-32, 91 Cal. Rptr. 263, 265 (1970); Eilken v. Morrison, 3 Cal. App.
3d 25, 29, 83 Cal. Rptr. 336, 338 (1969); Barnard v. Municipal Court, 142 Cal. App. 2d
324, 326-27, 298 P.2d 679, 680 (1956). See also C.E.B., California Civil Writs 9, 15,
67, 90 (1970).
62. O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 187
(1921).
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face of other adequate remedies. In one recent case, both rules
are stated on the same page,63 without any recognition of the
inconsistency between them.
The tension between the rule established in Brock and
the doctrine Brock pronounced dead is ineluctable, and as set
forth below, 4 there are some significant recent signs of departure from Brock's approach to the applicability of mandamus
to quasi-legislative actions in the presence of other adequate
remedies.
THE CASE OF THE PHANTOM STATUTE

As discussed above, the rule announced in Brock that
mandamus is routinely available to review quasi-legislative actions is entirely irreconcilable with the doctrine, quite alive
and well, that mandamus may not be invoked in the face of
other adequate remedies. Were this all that was wrong with
the rule, those indifferent to jurisprudential symmetry might
agree with the words of Justice Frankfurter (albeit uttered in
a different context) that "the most constructive way of resolv65
ing conflicts is to avoid them." For almost three decades, the
courts have avoided any hint of overt recognition that the rule
in Brock is baseless and inconsistent. While some 6may dismiss
consistency as "the hobgoblin of little minds," the inescapable fact that the rule is thoroughly refuted by the very
statute it invokes must be allowed as a palpable, and by any
fair reckoning, a terminal infirmity.
It is a peculiarity of the cases that when the proposition
is recited that "[tlhe courts may rely upon mandamus under
Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 to review the validity of
67
a quasi-legislative action," the opinion virtually never quotes

the referenced statute. Indeed, Brock coyly never once mentions section 1085, but refers obliquely to mandate "indepen-

343
63. Glendale City Employees' Ass'n v. City of Glendale, 15 Cal. 3d 328,
denied, 424
n.20, 540 P.2d 609, 619 n.20, 124 Cal. Rptr. 513, 523 n.20 (1975), cert.
U.S. 943 (1976).
64. See text accompanying note 100 infra.
(1952)
65. Western Pacific R.R. Corp. v. Western Pacific R.R., 345 U.S. 247, 270
(concurring opinion).
66. R.W. EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in ESSAys 41 (1961). Mr. Emerson, oft-misof "foolish consistency."
quoted, was speaking, however,
Cal. 3d
67. Clean Air Constituency v. California State Air Resources Bd., 11
at note 1
801, 809, 523 P.2d 617, 621, 114 Cal. Rptr. 577, 581 (1974). See cases cited

supra.
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dently of section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ' 68
Such reticence inspires an investigator to review section 1085
and judicial construction of the statute.
Since its enactment in 1872, Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 has provided, in relevant part, that the writ of mandamus "may be issued . . . to compel the performance of an
act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from
an office, trust or station . . . ." The reference to "an act
which the law specially enjoins" has been taken as denoting
an action specifically (as distinguished from generally) required by law. 9
Thus, for example, in Black v. City of Santa Monica,
plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus against a municipality in
connection with an alleged breach of contract. After ruling
that mandamus would not lie because a suit for damages was

an adequate remedy, the court held:
Furthermore, the law imposes upon municipal corporations and their officers no special duty to carry out the
terms of contracts or to refrain from breaches of contractual relations. They are not singled out, as distinguished
from other corporate entities or other individuals, as obligations .... 71
68. 109 Cal. App. 2d at 601, 241 P.2d at 288.
69. Consolidated Printing & Publishing Co. v. Allen, 18 Cal. 2d 63, 66, 112 P.2d
884, 886 (1941) ("[T]he writ will issue where the duty is one specifically enjoined
....
"); Pacific Palisades Ass'n v. Huntington Beach, 196 Cal. 211, 222, 237 P. 538,
542 (1925); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 73 Cal. App. 3d 660,
669, 140 Cal. Rptr. 859, 862 (1977); Draper v. Grant, 91 Cal. App. 2d 566, 569, 205
P.2d 399, 401 (1949); Dormax Oil Co. v. Bush, 42 Cal. App. 2d 243, 245, 108 P.2d 710,
711 (1925); see also Faulkner v. California Toll Bridge Auth., 40 Cal. 2d 317, 326, 253
P.2d 659, 665 (1953); Sherman v. Quinn, 31 Cal. 2d 661, 664, 192 P.2d 17, 19 (1948);
Marina Plaza v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 73 Cal. App. 3d 311,
323, 140 Cal. Rptr. 725, 732 (1977); Chandler v. Los Angeles City High School Dist.,
28 Cal. App. 2d 594, 597, 83 P.2d 68, 69 (1938). "The word 'general' means 'pertaining
to . . . all members of a class, kind or order . . . as a general law' and its antonyms
are 'particular, specific, precise . . . special.' [Citation omitted]." Schlageter Estate
Co. v. Koontz, 97 Cal. App. 2d 814, 819, 218 P.2d 814, 817 (1950).
70. 13 Cal. App. 2d 4, 56 P.2d 256 (1936).
71. 13 Cal. App. 2d at 6, 56 P.2d at 257; see also Wenzler v. Municipal Court,
235 Cal. App. 2d 128, 132, 45 Cal. Rptr. 54, 57 (1965). In Ramsay v. Cullen, 56 Cal.
App. 5, 6, 204 P.2d 251, 252 (1921), mandate was sought against an ordinance alleged
to have resulted from fraud. The court refused to issue the writ, because
[t]he law does not specially enjoin legislative bodies to repeal ordinances
which have sprung from their counsels as the result of frauds, no matter
how strongly it may be asserted that it is . . . their moral duty.
Id., 204 P.2d at 252. See Perrin v. Honeycutt, 144 Cal. 87, 90, 77 P. 776, 777 (1904).
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The court was not, of course, saying that municipalities have
no duty to adhere to their contracts-that duty, however, is
general and pervasive, rather that specific and concrete. Substantive review of a quasi-legislative action "is limited to an
examination of the proceedings before the officer to determine
whether his action has been arbitrary, capricious, or entirely
lacking in evidentiary support .. " and is thus "'based on
no more than the will or desire of the decision-maker and is
not supported by a fair or substantial reason . . .' ,, A duty
of government more general and pervasive than to refrain
from arbitrary, capricious, and baseless actions could scarce
be conceived. 4
The statutory limitation on the availability of mandamus
to "an act which the law specially enjoins" means that the
writ is not available save in "a case where the act was definite,
certain and fixed, and where its character and scope, and the
result to flow from it, were as well known before the doing of
the act as afterwards. '75 This is obviously not the case with
respect to quasi-legislative actions, as within the realm of non76
arbitrary decisions a variety of valid results are possible.
The conclusion would, then, seem inexorable that the
limitation on the availability of mandamus to the enforcement
of actions "which the law specially enjoins" precludes use of
the writ to review quasi-legislative administrative actions,
72. Pitts v. Perluss, 58 Cal. 2d 824, 833, 377 P.2d 83, 88, 27 Cal. Rptr. 19, 24
(1962); Rivera v. Division of Indus. Welfare, 265 Cal. App. 2d 576, 594, 71 Cal. Rptr.
739, 755 (1968).
73. California Ass'n of Nursing Homes v. Williams, 4 Cal. App. 3d 800, 810 n.10,
84 Cal. Rptr. 590, 597 n.10 (1970) (quoting Clack v. State, 275 Cal. App. 2d 743, 747,
80 Cal. Rptr. 274, 276 (1969)).
74. See, e.g., Farrell v. County of Placer, 23 Cal. 3d 624, 628, 145 P.2d 570, 572
(1944); Crumpler v. Board of Admin., 32 Cal. App. 3d 567, 579-80, 108 Cal. Rptr. 293,
302 (1973); Shoban v. Board of Trustees, 276 Cal. App. 2d 534, 543, 81 Cal. Rptr. 112,
117 (1969); Cruise v. City & County of San Francisco, 101 Cal. App. 2d 558, 565, 225
P.2d 988, 993 (1951).
75. Jacobs v. Board of Supervisors, 100 Cal. 121, 129, 34 P. 630, 632 (1893);
Browning v. Dow, 60 Cal. App. 680, 683, 213 P. 707, 708-09 (1923).
76. Rible v. Hughes, 24 Cal. 2d 437, 445, 150 P.2d 455, 459 (1944); Ray v.
Parker, 15 Cal. 2d 275, 305, 310-11, 101 P.2d 665, 681, 683-84 (1940); Action Trailer
Sales, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 54 Cal. App. 3d 125, 133, 126 Cal. Rptr. 339,
344 (1975). See also Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 3337 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976), which underscores the policy-making
role of administrative agencies in the context of environmental regulation on the
frontiers of scientific knowledge.
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gave consideration of whether procedural prerequisites"7 were
performed and then subject to the condition that no other
remedy is adequate to address that issue in a given case. 78
Before we precipitously conclude that the statute means
what it says, we must pause to consider the judicial exegesis.
The "plain meaning rule" notwithstanding, 9 the sentiment is
not wholly dead that "[t]he words [a judge] must construe are
empty vessels into which he can pour nearly anything he
will. ,8o

In the case of section 1085 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
the course of judicial construction resembles a game of "telephone," with each interpretative step being based on its
precedessor, without further reference to the statute, until the
final result bears scarcely a familial likeness to the original
legislative message.
The first step on this journey away from the statute was
the equation of the reference to duties "which the law specially enjoins" with "ministerial duties," a not unlikely holding: "The statute [section 1085] tersely declares that the writ
is available 'to compel the performance of an act which the
law specially enjoins ....
' Thus it is limited to the enforcement of purely ministerial duties
.
"8
The next step, of
77. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11420-11427 (Deering 1973); see cases cited at note 72
supra.
78. See text accompanying notes 55-56 supra.
79. See Leroy T. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 12 Cal. 3d 434, 438, 525
P.2d 665, 666-67, 115 Cal. Rptr. 761, 762-63 (1974), where the court quoted the
United States Supreme Court:
'[']']he meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the
language in which the [statute] is framed, and if that is plain . . . the
sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.'
Id. (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)). See also Vallerga
v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 53 Cal. 2d 313, 318, 347 P.2d 909, 912,
1 Cal. Rptr. 494, 497 (1959); People v. Sands, 102 Cal. 12, 16, 36 P. 404, 405 (1894); In
re W.R.W., 17 Cal. App. 3d 1029, 1033, 95 Cal. Rptr. 354, 357 (1971); People v. Chambers, 7 Cal. 3d 666, 674, 498 P.2d 1024, 1029, 102 Cal. Rptr. 776, 781 (1972).
80. Hand, Sources of Tolerance, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1930).
81. Gong v. City of Fremont, 250 Cal. App. 2d 568, 572, 58 Cal. Rptr. 664, 668
(1967) (citation omitted). See State Bd. of Equalization v. Watson, 68 Cal. 2d 307,
311, 437 P.2d 761, 763, 66 Cal. Rptr. 377, 379 (1968); Frost v. Trustees of Cal. State
Univ. & Colleges, 46 Cal. App. 3d 225, 229, 120 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1975); Hilton v.
Board of Supervisors, 7 Cal. App. 3d 708, 713, 86 Cal. Rptr. 754, 757 (1970) ("By the
statute's very terms it is thus limited to the enforcement of purely ministerial
duties .. ").
While in Flora Crane Serv., Inc. v. Ross, 61 Cal. 2d 199, 203, 390 P.2d 193, 196,
37 Cal. Rptr. 425, 428 (1964), the requirement of the statute was said to be "a clear
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course, was to interpret the term "ministerial," which was in
turn invoked to interpret the statutory language. The courts
decided that this term is to be understood as the opposite of
"discretionary," 2 thus invoking still another term.
To this point, no administrative actions properly described as quasi-legislative could be reviewed under the mandamus statute, for the essence of quasi-legislative actions is
the exercise of discretion. 8 The next step, however, requires
that the reader's eyes be affixed firmly on the shells:
[T]he writ of mandate will not issue ordinarily to control
and present ministerial duty," other cases have equivocated and phrased the requirement as being a "clear, present and usually [sic] ministerial duty." Loder v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal. 3d 859, 863, 553 P.2d 624, 627, 132 Cal. Rptr. 464, 467 (1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1109 (1977); People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 5 Cal.
3d 480, 491, 487 P.2d 1193, 1199, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553, 559 (1971); Larson v. City of
Redondo Beach, 27 Cal. App. 3d 332, 336, 103 Cal. Rptr. 592, 594 (1972); Franklin v.
Municipal Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 884, 898, 103 Cal. Rptr. 354, 363 (1972). These cases
do not cite Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 2d 803,
813, 25 Cal. Rptr. 798, 805 (1962), which appears to be the first case to use this language. None of these cases spell out the reason for the cautionary insertion nor how it
was derived from the statute.
82. E.g., Glendale City Employees' Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Glendale, 15 Cal. 3d
328, 344, 540 P.2d 609, 620, 124 Cal. Rptr. 513, 524 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943,
(" 'The critical question in determining if an act required by law is ministerial in
character is whether it involves the exercise of judgment and discretion.' ") (citation
omitted); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 59 Cal. App.
3d 959, 969, 131 Cal. Rptr. 172, 178 (1976); People ex rel. Fund Am. Cos. v. California
Ins. Co., 43 Cal. App. 3d 423, 431, 117 Cal. Rptr. 623, 628 (1974), where the court
stated:
Discretion may be defined, when applied to public functionaries, as the
power conferred on them by law to act officially according to the dictates of their own judgment. A minsterial act, on the other hand, is one
that a public officer is required to perform in a prescribed manner in
obedience to the mandate of legal authority and without regard to his
own judgment or opinion concerning the propriety or impropriety of the
act to be performed, when a given state of facts exists. [Citation omitted.] Stated otherwise, it is an act with respect to the performance of
which a public officer can exercise no discretion-an act or duty prescribed by some existing law that makes it incumbent on him to perform
precisely as laid down by the law. [Citations omitted].
A nice illustration of the operation of this distinction is to be found in cases
holding that mandamus will issue to enforce the ministerial duty of an officer to exercise his discretion, e.g., Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 925-26, 553 P.2d 565,
577-78, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405, 417-18 (1976); Shepard v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 107,
118, 550 P.2d 161,166, 130 Cal. Rptr. 257, 262 (1976); Anderson v. Phillips, 13 Cal. 3d
733, 736, 532 P.2d 1247, 1249, 119 Cal. Rptr. 879, 881 (1975); Ballard v. Anderson, 4
Cal. 3d 873, 885, 484 P.2d 1345, 1353, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9 (1971); Knoff v. City &
County of San Francisco, 1 Cal. App. 3d 184, 197, 81 Cal. Rptr. 683, 691 (1960).
83. City Council v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 2d 389, 393-94, 3 Cal. Rptr.
796, 799 (1960); see cases cited at note 2 supra.
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the exercise of discretion by one in whom the law reposes
such discretion . . ., but the rule is qualified in that, 'An
abuse of discretion, however, is not the exercise of discretion, and it is settled that the writ will issue to correct
such abuse if the facts otherwise justify its issuance.'"
Although the chain of logic reconciling this rule with the rule
that mandamus lies only to compel ministerial acts is nowhere
fleshed out, it apparently runs rather like the following. Actions may be classed as either ministerial or discretionary.
Therefore, any action not discretionary must be ministerial.
As no official has been granted the discretion to abuse his discretion, it follows that the abuse of discretion is not a discretionary act. Therefore, it is a ministerial act and mandate will
issue to correct the abuse.
If this logic is troublesome in the abstract, its early application was not, for the "abuse of discretion" reasoning was
considered a restatement of the following rule:
Our view of the law then was, and yet is, that if an
official duty is to be performed on the happening of an
event, the officer cannot arbitrarily and capriciously refuse to perform it after the event has happened, on the
plea that he is not satisfied that it has happened. If the
fact exists, and is established by sufficient proofs, it is his
85
legal duty to be satisfied, and to act accordingly.
In Phyle v. Duffy, 86 for example, the court considered a
statute which "provides that where there is good reason to believe a condemned prisoner is insane the warden must insti7
tute a proceeding directed to . . . the issue of his sanity. ' 8
The court invoked the rule that
[m]andate is the proper remedy to compel a public officer
to perform an official duty, and it may be had not only
upon a failure to exercise a duty but also where the officer's refusal to do so constitutes an abuse of discretion.88
Several cases have applied the same principle where an applicant satisfied the criteria for a license or certificate, and yet it
84. Hays v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 260, 265-66, 105 P.2d 975, 978-79 (1940)
(citations omitted); Browning v. Dow, 60 Cal. App. 680, 682, 213 P. 707, 708 (1923).
85. Stockton R.R. v. Stockton, 51 Cal. 328, 339 (1876).
86. 34 Cal. 2d 144, 208 P.2d 668 (1949).
87. Id. at 153, 208 P.2d at 673 (emphasis in original).
88. Id.
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was arbitrarily denied. 9
Another variation on this theme is found in Raisch v.
Board of Education0 where a school district contracted for
some rubber hose and then refused to pay. The court noted
that a statute established a duty to pay the bill, except that
the board might "reject any such demand for good cause, of
which said board shall be the sole judge."9 The board's argument that it had adjudged not to pay and that its decision was
conclusive, was brushed aside:
But although the board is to be the 'sole judge' of
what is good cause, still the rejection cannot be arbitrary
or capricious. There must be at least the semblance of a
cause. The board, after obtaining materials which it has
ordered and needs for school purposes, cannot say: "True,
the materials are of the kind and quality ordered, but we
have concluded not to pay for them, and therefore reject
the demand." . . . If there was no semblance of cause,

then it is clear that it was the duty of the board to draw
the drafts, and the writ2 will be granted to compel the performance of this duty.

These cases and others93 display two salient features:
First, it cannot escape notice that in each case the "discretion" reposed in the administrative agency was solely quasijudicial, as it called for the mere determination of an issue of
fact upon which the application of a settled rule depends,
89.
Barton,
(1857).
90.
91.
92.
93.

E.g., Keller v. Hewett, 109 Cal. 146, 148, 41 P. 871, 872 (1895); Henry v.
107 Cal. 535, 536, 40 P. 798 (1895); Thomas v. Armstrong, 7 Cal. 287, 288
81 Cal. 542, 22 P. 890 (1889).
Id. at 545, 22 P. at 890.
Id. at 546-47, 22 P. at 891.
E.g., Dufton v. Daniels, 190 Cal. 576, 213 P. 949 (1923), a case wherein

[t]he code section makes it the plain duty of the board of control to
audit and allow the necessary travelling expenses of the petitioner ...
unless in fact the fugitive so returned by him was not placed on trial.
Id. at 580, 213 P. at 950. The State's claim that the fugitive was not "placed on trial"
was rejected because "the facts are all admitted and are susceptible to but one construction." Id. at 580-81, 213 P. at 950. See also Tulare Water Co. v. State Water
Comm'n, 187 Cal. 533, 536, 202 P. 874, 876 (1921) (holding that "[tihe commission
surely does not possess and could not be invested with the power to arbitrarily deny
an application made in conformity to the law for the appropriation of water that was
subject to appropriation."); City of San Marcos v. California Highway Comm'n, 60
Cal. App. 3d 383, 417-18, 131 Cal. Rptr. 804, 826-27 (1976); Ellis v. City Council, 222
Cal. App. 2d 490, 497, 35 Cal. Rptr. 317, 321 (1963); Hand v. El Dorado Irrigation
Dist., 97 Cal. App. 740, 276 P. 137 (1929).
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rather than the formulation of a policy to be applied in future
cases. 94 More to the point for present purposes is that there
was, in each case, an undeniable ministerial duty. 95 The sole
issue was whether the agency would be allowed to interpose a
bogus excuse to avoid its performance. The presence of a ministerial duty kept each case tethered to the statute authorizing
mandamus.
The final step in this judicial evolution has been, of
course, to unhitch the "abuse of discretion" test from the requirement of a ministerial duty, and apply it to agencies acting in a quasi-legislative capacity, 96 not bothering to note that
the remedy may no longer be authorized in this new context.
The fallacy of this last step is immediately revealed when we
compare the result of this construction with the original statutory language. As was pointed out,97 the general and pervasive
obligation of government to act reasonably is not "an act
which the law specially enjoins," nor is it so "definite, certain
and fixed . . . [in] its character and scope . . .[that] the result to flow from it [is] as well known before the doing of the
act as afterwards.""
In short, the statute is simply not applicable to quasi-legislative actions, nor can it be made applicable by ignoring its
text or fabricating a chain of dubious interpretive glosses, no
matter how lengthy or tortuous. 99
94. See note 2 supra.
95. As the rule was expressed in Inglin v. Hoppin, 156 Cal. 483, 105 P. 582
(1909), stated:
Where discretion other than legislative is vested in such a subordinate
officer or tribunal, the exercise of that discretion will be subjected to
correction if abused. Where the act is in its nature ministerial and depends upon the existence or non-existence of facts, if the jurisdiction to
determine the fact be vested, in the first instance, in such inferior tribunal, its determination made upon conflicting evidence will not be reviewed. Yet, if the case presented be one where the decision has been in
such flat opposition to the plain and uncontradicted facts as to force the
conclusion that the decision was in bad faith, a review by the courts will
always be open . ...
Id. at 487, 105 P. at 583-84 (emphasis added).
96. See note 72 supra.
97. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
98. Jacobs v. Board of Supervisors, 100 Cal. at 129, 34 P. at 632.
99. The inapplicability of the statute to quasi-legislative actions would obtain,
of course, irrespective of the unavailability or inadequacy of alternative remedies,
such as injunctive or declaratory relief. As applied to that limited class of cases, an
argument can be fashioned that the statute unconstitutionally limits the jurisdiction
of the courts.
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CRACKS IN THE WALL

As of this writing, no case has undertaken a critical examination of the rule laid down in Brock, or of the analysis proffered to justify that rule. Some recent cases, however, have
disposed of petitions for mandamus with reasoning wholly irreconcilable with that case.
In Malibu West Swimming Club v. Flournoy, a0a for example, an order of the State Controller dubbed as quasi-legislative' 0 ' was attacked by way of mandamus. The court first
noted the rule of Brock that "[a] party may seek review of a
quasi-legislative action through a 'traditional' mandamus proceeding under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085.''102 Departing abruptly from the approach of Brock, the court then
announced:
Availability of review by traditional mandamus does
not equate with entitlement to it. The writ will not be
granted where the petitioner has an adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law .... The adequacy of other
Authority to grant relief "in the nature of mandamus" is founded in the constitution (CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10) and "the cases [have] held that such jurisdiction
could not be enlarged, and occasionally added by way of dictum that it could not be
curtailed [citation omitted]." Modern Barber College v. California Employment Stability Comm'n, 31 Cal. 2d 720, 731, 192 P.2d 916, 922 (1948). See Saxton v. Board of
Educ., 206 Cal. 758, 768, 276 P. 998, 1002 (1929); Mojave River Irrigation Dist. v.
Superior Court, 202 Cal. 717, 724, 262 P. 724, 727 (1927); Miller & Lux v. Board of
Supervisors, 189 Cal. 254, 259-60, 208 P. 304, 307 (1922).
If mandamus is "the remedial writ which will be used to correct those acts and
decisions of administrative agencies which are in violation of law, where no other
adequate remedy is provided," Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Employment
Comm'n, 17 Cal. 2d 321, 329, 109 P.2d 935, 940 (1941), no statute can forbid the
issuance of the writ in such a circumstance. Such a holding would be entirely compatible with the thesis of this article, that mandamus is, and of right ought to be, an
extraordinary remedy.
It might be noted in this connection that in 1966 the constitution was amended
to alter the grant of jurisdiction from the "power to issue writs of mandamus" (former CAL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 4, 4b, 5) to the present language granting "jurisdiction in
proceedings for extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus (CAL. CONST. art. VI,
§§ 4, 4b, 5)." The issue of whether a similar change in the statute granting jurisdiction to federal courts to issue the writ was intended to broaden its availability was
raised, but not decided, in Burnett v. Tolson, 474 F.2d 877, 880 (4th Cir. 1973). For
present purposes, it should be stressed that the amended language reaffirms that
mandamus is a species of "extraordinary relief." The courts possess no more authority to expand their constitutionally granted jurisdiction than the legislature has to
contract it.
100. 60 Cal. App. 3d 161, 131 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1976).
101. Id. at 164, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
102. Id.
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remedies requires an inquiry into the circumstances of
the particular case .... 10s
After Examining the circumstances then at bar, the court concluded that the petitioners had an adequate remedy in paying
the additional tax occasioned by the order and suing to recover it. 04
This, of course, was utterly opposed to Brock and the
cases that follow its doctrine,108 none of which undertake "an
inquiry into the circumstances of the particular case" to determine the adequacy of alternative relief, let alone placing
the burden on the petitioner to demonstrate the inadequacy
of such remedies. 10 6 According to Brock, the "other remedies"
rule is dead, and mandamus is available irrespective of what
other relief might have been sought. 10 7 While previous *cases
had come to a similar result, also relying on the "other remedies" doctrine,1 08 those cases involved almost exclusively review of assessment adjudications, expressly categorized as
quasi-judical, and attempts at review pursuant to the administrative mandamus statute. Here, the court directly invades
the territory staked out by Brock.
Interestingly, it has been held that declaratory relief is
available to review the validity of state tax regulations without the necessity of paying the tax and suing for a refund.' 0 9
Placed alongside Malibu West Swimming Club (which has
been cited with approval by one court"0 and followed by still
another"') a palpable conflict in the cases is established.
While Malibu West Swimming Club is irreconcilable with
Brock because it ignores Brock's premature requiem for the
"other remedies" doctrine, two other cases are irreconcilable
with Brock because they display uncharacteristic conscious103. Id. (citation omitted).
104. Id. at 164-65, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 281-82.
105. See note 1 supra.
106. See note 56 supra.
107. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
108. See cases cited in County of Sacramento v. Assessment Appeals Bd. No. 2,
32 Cal. App. 3d 654, 672, 108 Cal. Rptr. 434, 447 (1973).
109. Pacific Motor Transport Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 28 Cal. App. 3d
230, 104 Cal. Rptr. 558 (1972). But see Casey v. Bonelli, 93 Cal. App. 2d 253, 208 P.2d
723 (1949).
110. Hogya v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 122, 130, 142 Cal. Rptr. 325, 331
(1977).
111. Honeywell, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 48 Cal. App. 3d 907, 914, 122
Cal. Rptr. 243, 247 (1975).
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ness of the governing statute.
The first of these cases, State of California v. Superior
Court (Veta),"12 was an action by a disappointed applicant to
the California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission for a
permit to develop coastal property."1 8 The petitioners sought
review of the Commission's decision, inter alia, by way of
mandamus. The California Supreme Court made fast work of
the petition:
Veta seeks to invoke the "traditional mandamus"
provisions of section 1085 of the Code of Civil Procedure
That section may be employed to compel perform....
ance of a duty which is purely ministerial in character; it
cannot be applied to control discretion as to a matter lawfully entrusted to the Commission ....
Even the most cursory examination of the Act reveals
that determination of whether an applicant qualifies for a
permit is entrusted to the Commission's discretion. Thus,
a permit may not issue unless the Commission finds, for
example, that the development will not have any substantial adverse environmental or ecological effect ... or irreversibly commit coastal zone resources, and that the proposed development will enhance the environment of the
The application of these factors recoastal zone ....
quires the Commission to undertake a delicate balancing
of the effect of each proposed development upon the environment of the coast as a predicate to the issuance of a
permit. This process is manifestly inconsistent with an assertion that the Commission's functions in this regard are
purely ministerial in character. Thus, the trial court
should have sustained the general demurrer insofar as the
petition seeks to compel the Commission to issue the
permit." 4
This straightforward adherence to the terms of the statute is at marked variance with the authorities discussed
above," 5 which obscurely proclaim that an "abuse" of discretion is not the "exercise" of discretion and therefore, somehow, falls within the terms of the statute designed to enforce
ministerial duties. As was noted, if the statutory language is
112.
113.
114.
omitted).
115.

12 Cal. 3d 237, 524 P.2d 1281, 115 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1974).
Id. at 242-43, 524 P.2d at 1284, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
Id. at 247-48, 524 P.2d at 1287-88, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 503-04 (citations
See text accompanying notes 84-98 supra.
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followed, virtually no determination made in a quasi-legislative capacity would be reviewable by mandamus, as the essence of a quasi-legislative action is the exercise of
discretion.1 16
It is significant that the petition in State of California v.
Superior Court (Veta) could have been dispatched with as
great alacrity on an alternate ground that is not dissonant
with prior authority. The Attorney General had conceded that
review might be had by "administrative mandamus" pursuant
to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5.117 The court could
have invoked the rule that where review under that section is
available, a petitioner may not seek review by way of "traditional mandamus" under Code of Civil Procedure section
1085.118
The sustaining of a demurrer was likewise the subject of
review in Hilton v. Board of Supervisors. 9 The petition alleged that the Board should not have rezoned certain property
because, inter alia, "the evidence presented to the board overwhelmingly favored a denial of the rezoning amendment, the
ignoring of which evidence amounted to a prejudicial abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent body."1 20 The court affirmed the sustaining of the demurrer, stating:
There is no allegation by petitioners, nor could there
be, that it was the ministerial duty of respondents to rescind the ordinance here involved, since numerous cases
uniformly hold that the enactment of a zoning ordinance
is purely a legislative act and a governmental function
.... Too, since the passage of a zoning ordinance is a
legislative act, it necessarily follows that the vacating of
such an enactment (the relief here sought) is likewise legislative in character . . . . "[T]he complaint simply asks
the court to issue the writ to compel ... the defendant
...to perform a legislative act .... It is elementary
'21
that the courts have no such power.'
116. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
117. 12 Cal. 3d at 245, 524 P.2d at 1286, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
118. Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 813-15, 567 P.2d
1162, 1167-68, 140 Cal. Rptr. 442, 447-48 (1977); California Teachers Ass'n v. Governing Bd., 70 Cal. App. 3d 833, 844, 139 Cal. Rptr. 155, 160-61 (holding that the
defect cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).
119. 7 Cal. App. 3d 708, 86 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1970).
120. Id. at 713, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
121. Id. (citation omitted).
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The aforementioned cases are, of course, woefully outnumbered by those mechanically citing and following the rule
of Brock. The former can be dismissed as sporadic examples
of that fundamentalist fidelity to legislative direction that unexpectedly grips a court and is promptly forgotten. And it
may be that these flirtations with logic and tradition and statutory limitations are weaker than the tendency of the courts
toward an incestuous relationship with their own past
thoughts. A conflict in the cases exists, however, that invites
the supreme court to critically reexamine this issue.1 22
A PRACTICAL POSTSCRIPT
At present, one seeking judicial review of a quasi-legislative action has the untrammelled option of: 1) seeking a declaratory judgment of his rights, 2) applying for a writ of
mandate, 3) requesting an injunction against enforcement of
the regulation, or 4) any combination of the above.' 28 The
forms and combinations of remedies chosen may have significant, and sometimes unintended, procedural consequences.
For example, while precedence is accorded to trials in actions requesting an injunction1 24 or declaratory relief, 2 8 at
least both sides know that the trial cannot be held until the
1 26
statutory thirty days allowed for an answer have elapsed
and the case is at issue. In more crowded courts, even cases
granted precedence may be considerably delayed.
By contrast, an action in mandamus may proceed on a
blindingly fast track. Originally, the only issues to be determined in a mandate action were whether a specific, ministerial
action was required by law, and whether it had been performed. The trial on these issues occurs, absent some other
order of the court, on the date set for return on the alternative writ,12 7 which may be only a few days after the action was
122.

CAL. R. CT. 29(a).

123. Leahey v. Department of Water & Power, 76 Cal. App. 2d 281, 285, 173
P.2d 69, 71-72 (1946); see note 22 supra.
124.

CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 527 (West 1979).

125. Id. § 1062(a). The action for declaratory relief may be slowed if other relief
is also requested, in which case the matter "shall take precedence only upon noticed
motion and a showing that the action requires a speedy trial." Id.
126. Id. § 412.20.
127. The date for the return and hearing is specified in the alternative
writ . . ..

On the hearing date, all parties must be ready to proceed, with all
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filed. r ' As Bernard Witkin rightly complained, such a procedure was never designed to operate in the context of modern
administrative law:
The traditional and conventional writ of mandamus was
never devised for [administrative review], nor would the
restoration of certiorari to pre-Standard Oil days be any
better. Modern administrative law has become. . . complex and distinctive and important. . . .I think it would
be a big step to divorce administrative review from the
writ procedure and handle it separately. 129
For example, a petitioner may challenge by way of mandamus a health standard for some toxic substance set by a
regulatory agency after consideration of a voluminous mass of
scientific data. Especially in such a case, a court "must engage
in a 'substantial inquiry' into the facts, one that is 'searching
and careful.' ,1s The reviewing court must consider the most
complex evidentiary matters.
Even in such a case, it is not atypical for a petitioner
claiming grievous financial harm from the operation of the
regulation to demand the immediate trial the statute potentially affords him. On the other side, the administrative
agency may seek advantage from the facts that although the
burden is on the petitioner to obtain and file the administrative record,"'1 the materials constituting the full record are
most often in the hands of the agency alone, thus allowing it
memoranda completed and filed; the court may, however, permit the
filing of additional memoranda ....
In the superior court, the case may be heard and determined on the
record, pleadings, and oral argument as in a usual law and motion
matter.
[G]enerally in the larger counties the case is heard in the Law and
Motion Department of the superior court.
C.E.B., California Civil Writs 404-05, §§ 17.1, 17.3.
128. CAL. CIVIL PROC. CODE § 1108 (West 1979), provides that the hearing may
"bie had at any time." Id. §§ 1089, 1090, 1094.
129. Witkin, The Extraordinary Writ-Friend or Enemy, 29 J. ST. B. CAL.
467, 475 (1954) (emphasis in original).
130. Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 35 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16
(1971)).
131. Alford v. Pierno, 27 Cal. App. 3d 682, 690-91, 104 Cal. Rptr. 110, 115-16
(1972); Luxor Cab Co. v. Cahill, 21 Cal. App. 3d 551, 557, 98 Cal. Rptr. 576, 580
(1971); Gong v. City of Fremont, 250 Cal. App. 2d 568, 574, 58 Cal. Rptr. 664, 669
(1967). But see Dare v. Board of Medical Examiners, 21 Cal. 2d 790, 798, 136 P.2d
304, 308-09 (1943).
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to control the speed of the assembly, duplication, and release
of the record." 2 The agency may also insist on a trial on the
date of return on the alternative writ, catching the petitioner
unprepared.
It may be rightly objected that an astute, sensitive, and
informed trial court would not allow such abuses, and that the
flexibility of mandamus procedure allows a prompt hearing
consistent with adequate preparation of court and counsel
with the appellate courts standing ready to correct particularly egregious errors. Even eschewing a challenge of this idealized view of the judiciary, whether or not a trial court is accorded such wonderful flexibility should not depend upon into
which door of the writ house the petitioner has wandered. Any
need for immediate relief can be adequately afforded by
means of a restraining order or injunction. Moreover, procedural predictability, while the most humble of desiderata, is
not the least important.
The second procedural consequence of the remedy pursued is that while a judgment in a declaratory relief action
declares that "plaintiff is entitled" to certain relief and
that "it is the duty of defendants" to do certain things
...in a mandamus proceeding defendants would have
been commanded to perform the duties which the court
determined should be performed.188
It has been suggested, for that reason, "that mandamus
against a public officer is a more adequate remedy than declaratory relief."' 84
While it is doubtless not unknown for an administrative
agency to ignore a judicial declaration, this should not be presumed to be the natural and reflexive response:
A declaratory judgment is an adjudication, not an abstraction .... Public officials must respect the court's

declaration and follow its interpretation of the law ....
132. No statute or rule of court regulates the speed with which an administrative record must be prepared in a mandamus action challenging a quasi-legislative
act. Cf. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11523 (West Supp. 1980) (which provides that an agency
must provide the record within 30 days of a request therefor when an administrative
adjudication is challenged under the Administrative Procedure Act).
133. Leahey v. Department of Water & Power, 76 Cal. App. 2d 281, 285, 173
P.2d 69, 71 (1946).
134. Berkeley School Dist. v. City of Berkeley, 141 Cal. App. 2d 841, 845, 297
P.2d 710, 712 (1956).
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For purposes of judicial finality there is no more reason
for assuming that a commission will disregard the direct:ion of a reviewing court than that a lower court will do
5

SO."

Should the plaintiff fear that this presumption might not be
translated into reality in his particular case, he is free to seek
an injunction against enforcement of the rule or regulation ancillary to the declaratory relief.' 6 Should peculiar circumstances arise where even this relief would be inadequate to
vindicate a plaintiff's rights, the writ of mandamus would still
stand ready to fulfill its ancient offices.
CONCLUSION

Since its invention, the writ of mandamus has been considered a "'drastic and extraordinary' . . . remedy . . . reserved for really extraordinary causes.'1 7 The Constitution of
California accordingly specifies that mandamus is to be "extraordinary relief."' 3 8 The exigencies that led the supreme
court to turn to mandamus as the routine method of review of
quasi-judicial acts were never applicable to review of quasilegislative actions. Its availability in cases where it is not
needed serves mainly to inject an additional element of unpredictability into review proceedings. The statute that governs
issuance of the writ cannot be tortured to countenance the
present practice, and so has been largely ignored.
The reasoning expounded in the dicta in Brock, having
survived collapse from its own internal inadequacies only
through a protracted absence of critical review ought, one
might optimistically think, succumb to the overwhelming
force of the governing law. Whether it does will provide a fair
135. Louis Eckert Brewing Co. v. Unemployment Reserves Comm'n, 47 Cal.
App. 2d 844, 846, 119 P.2d 227, 228 (1941) (citations omitted). See Pacific Motor
Transport Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 28 Cal. App. 3d 230, 236, 104 Cal. Rptr.
558, 562 (1972) ("It will'be presumed that the governmental agency will respect a
judicial declaration concerning a regulation's validity.")
136. See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. State Dept. Pub. Health, 158 Cal. App.
2d 425, 443-44, 322 P.2d 968, 979 (1958); Staley v. Board of Medical Examiners, 109
Cal. App. 2d 1, 5-6, 240 P.2d 61, 64 (1952); Knox v. Wolfe, 73 Cal. App. 2d 494, 505,
167 P.2d 3, 9 (1946); Blatz Brewing Co. v..Collins, 69 Cal. App. 2d 639, 640, 160 P.2d
37, 38 (1945); Greenfield v. Board of City Planning Comm'rs, 6 Cal. App. 2d 515, 518,
45 P.2d 219, 220 (1935); James v. Hall, 88 Cal. App. 528, 535, 264 P. 516, 518 (1928).
137. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 106-07 (1967).
138. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10.
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test of Coke's saying: "The reason of the law is the life of the
law.""3 9 By that reckoning, the law as laid down in Brock is
already dead.

139.
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